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1.   Introduction 
 
The existence of large differences among regions occupies a large place in the current 
debate on decentralization and federalism in countries such as Belgium, Germany, Italy 
and Spain. In the case of France, a discussion in a sense similar is about regions 
overseas such as Guadeloupe, Martinique and Reunion. To discuss the implications of 
these differences, it is convenient, at the cost of some simplification, to distinguish 
between three economic perspectives on federalism and decentralization. Large spatial 
differences are essential to the first, may or may not be the source of a difficulty for the 
second, and threaten the relevance of the third. This paper is focussed on the third 
approach but a few words on the first two may bring the discussion in context. The first 
and earlier perspective may be referred to as “the traditional theory of fiscal 
federalism”. It concentrates on the assignment of competencies or tasks across levels of 
government, solutions to the problems that any assignment will raise (spillovers, equity, 
etc), and the ways subcentral governments are to be financed (Oates 1972). The 
assumption that many public policies - in particular, the provision of some categories of 
public goods - must be spatially differentiated is central to it. The larger the spatial 
differences among the preferences, needs or conditions of individuals, the stronger the 
case for decentralization and, when regions are concerned, federalism. When some 
differences are specific to particular regions, the traditional theory has no difficulty of 
principle to recommend a special status for these regions, a matter usually referred to as 
“asymmetric federalism”.  
Two objections to the theory are that it is based on an idealized view of 
government and that it does not acknowledge the fact that central governments in 
unitary states often have the capacity (in particular thanks to their local agents) to 
introduce spatial heterogeneity in some policy areas while maintaining homogeneity in 
others, in both cases as needed. Many analyses worked out in the framework of the 
traditional theory remain valuable for the study and understanding of aspects of 
decentralized systems once these systems are in place. But for the justification of 
decentralization, and perhaps also to explain the forms it takes or the way it evolves, the 
introduction of political economy considerations is needed.  
The second and third perspectives are based on such considerations, albeit ones 
which are different in the two cases. The second perspective may be called an   3
ademocratic political economy theory of federalism because the various analyses that it 
includes have in common a jaundiced view of government, unfettered faith in the 
working of markets, and no particular attention given to democratic processes. It 
portrays government as, at least potentially, predatory or the prey of interest groups 
(including is own bureaucracy). Thus, perhaps the main purpose of federalism is to 
discipline it (“taming the Leviathan”) by the way of jurisdictions competing among 
themselves for residents and investment (Brennan and Buchanan 1980). A more recent 
analysis stresses that the distribution of regulatory competencies among levels must be 
“market preserving” (Weingast 1995). And, more recently again (in particular with the 
case of China in mind), the recommendation is that the distribution of the benefits of 
economic growth be such that it induces subcentral governments to pursue it (Jin, Qian 
and Weingast 2005). To stress its distinctive characteristic again, in this general 
approach the question of whether governments on the different levels are democratic or 
not is largely irrelevant. 
As to regional differences, they enter the reasoning only as the result of 
competition. Regions that succeed thanks to their policies are richer, more populated 
and have a higher rate of growth than those whose policy is less market- or growth-
oriented. The rulers of the regions which succeed are rewarded by increased rents. 
Because all office-holders are assumed to understand this, all regions pursue the same 
objectives and the ex ante outcomes are more or less identical, even if, ex post, they 
may differ.  The possibility that, from the start, some regions have a natural advantage 
or disadvantage of some kind and thus that competition among regions may be 
unbalanced – so much so that some regions may even decide not to participate in it – is 
a major objection to the approach (Cai and Treisman 2005). A second objection is that 
not only bad policies may be eroded by mobility-based competition, but also “good” 
ones (the “race to the bottom” possibility) or, at any rate, policies to which the 
population is strongly attached. As a consequence, in democracies the ademocratic 
characteristic of the second approach may well turn out to be unsustainable.  
The democratic dimension is central to the third perspective. To be precise, 
because in all political regimes office-holders typically seek some consent from the 
population, the relevance of the approach is not limited to democracies in a narrow 
sense of the word (see Breton 1996). For convenience, however, we will refer to voters,   4
incumbents and elections. In democracies, the relationship between voters and 
politicians in office is multifaceted (Przeworski, Stokes and Manin 1999). We will 
consider here only the strand of political analysis that stresses the electoral 
accountability of office-holders. In it, the impact of decentralization or federalism is 
particularly direct. This is so because accountability is, in many policy areas, enhanced 
by “yardstick competition”. 
In a nutshell, the idea is as follows. Office-holders want to be re-elected. If 
political competition is strong, this outcome is uncertain. Voters decide, to a degree at 
least, on the basis of their perception of how the government performs or has performed 
– the idea of “retrospective voting”, broadly understood. Their choice, however, is 
affected by information asymmetry. To assess public policies, voters do not have all the 
information that office-holders detain and they cannot rely completely on what they are 
told (not only by incumbents and other candidates, but also by interest groups, the 
media, etc.). In a world submitted to rapid historical change and various kinds of 
shocks, the obstacles voters encounter in many policy areas to assess the performance of 
government are substantial.  Comparisons by voters between what obtains in the 
jurisdiction and what is the case in others – or, more generally, between what different 
governments, whether on the same or on different levels, do – may mitigate these 
difficulties. In turn, the fact that office-holders are aware of the existence or possibility 
of these comparisons affects their decisions. They want to be judged as performing 
comparatively well. This is the basis of what has been called “yardstick competition” 
among governments, which, under favourable circumstances, may strengthen in 
governments (not only politicians in office) the right kind of incentives.  
For these comparisons to be at all possible, the co-existence of several 
governments is necessary. Federalism and political decentralization imply such co-
existence and consequently offer a way to make office-holders more accountable. But 
comparisons raise various problems. One of the most serious is comparability. In 
Salmon (1987), the mechanism referred to today as yardstick competition was proposed 
as providing an argument for decentralization that is not based, contrary to the 
traditional theory of federalism, on spatial differentiation. This did not formally imply 
but could suggest that large differences among jurisdictions are an obstacle to effective 
comparisons. Actually, the affirmation that they are may be found here and there in the   5
literature. In the first part of the paper, thus, we discuss the degree to which large 
differences among regions may be an obstacle to yardstick competition. Governments 
may also compete for a good comparative evaluation with governments on other levels 
(central, regional, municipal). This is a form of vertical competition. As such, though 
important, we will not discuss it here (see Breton and Fraschini 2003, Breton 2006), our 
analysis being limited to horizontal competition.  
But there is another side to the matter. One may argue (Salmon 2003, 2006, e.g.) 
that yardstick competition at the level of the member countries of the European Union 
(EU) contributes to bring about a convergence of economic performance. If one country 
does a bit less well for a while (France, Italy), then forces related to yardstick 
competition tend to emerge that trigger reforms producing some catching up in 
subsequent periods. If one country is singled out for a time as doing much better 
(Britain), it is imitated and thus after a while loses its advantage or most of it. With 
regard to trends, some entrants (Greece, Ireland, Spain, Portugal) started from a level of 
economic development much lower than the EU average, others (Denmark, Sweden) 
from a level somewhat higher. In most cases these differences eroded in the course of 
time. We may expect many of the entrants of the last enlargements, all of them initially 
much poorer than the EU average, to catch up in a similar way.  
It is interesting for our purpose to note that, along many dimensions, the member 
countries of the EU were and remain very different. Their political institutions and 
practice, their legal institutions and practice, their economic specialization, the way they 
organize their health, education and welfare systems, the structure of their budgets and 
many other structural characteristics vary widely. This does not prevent a convergence 
of economic performance as well as of several important components of social 
performance (Coelli, Lefèbvre and Pestieau 2008). 
Along the same dimensions (political and legal systems, educational, health and 
welfare systems, etc.), the differences across the regions of a same country are typically 
much smaller than the differences across EU countries. This should be favourable to 
even greater or more rapid economic convergence. But this is not always the case.  In 
four of the five countries mentioned at the outset, Belgium, France, Germany and Italy, 
the concern manifested with regard to large regional differences is principally a concern 
with a part of the country (the regions overseas in the case of France) not catching up   6
with the rest. How can we explain that, in some countries, yardstick competition fails to 
prevent the persistence of large regional differences in economic performance? This is 
the question explored in the second part of the paper. 
 
2. Are large regional differences an obstacle to yardstick competition? 
 
Large differences between jurisdictions seem an obvious obstacle to the feasibility of 
relevant comparisons and thus to yardstick competition. Whether they constitute a 
serious obstacle or not depends on the nature of the questions asked or the perspectives 
adopted. We should distinguish here between the empirical work, usually focused on 
the interaction between a limited and precise set of variables, and views about the 
systemic role that yardstick competition may play, under decentralization, in enhancing 
accountability. Two different perspectives on this systemic role should be distinguished. 
Large differences are a serious obstacle in the first, less so in the second.  
 
2.1. Empirical studies in public finance: one dimension 
In the domain of public finance, understood broadly, there is now a substantial number 
of empirical studies that refer to yardstick competition.
1 A typical approach is the 
following.  Studies identify spatial interactions affecting one single variable (a particular 
tax for instance). These interactions may reflect various mechanisms or phenomena: 
some spillover effect of a non-political kind, an independently similar response to some 
common circumstances or change thereof, mimicking behaviour on the part of office-
holders. Mimicking behaviour, in turn, may be related to one form or another of 
yardstick competition or to mobility-based competition. The way to disentangle these 
possible mechanisms (which may account for the same observed spatial interaction) and 
identify the presence of  yardstick competition is to relate the spatial interaction with 
some political variable (term limits, size of the governing majority, date of the next 
election, popularity, probability of being re-elected, use of referendum). If such political 
variables prove significant, this will tend to comfort the interpretation of spatial 
                                                 
1 An incomplete list includes Besley and Case (1995), Ashworth and Heyndels (1997), Heyndels and 
Vuchelen (1998), Jayet, Paty and Pentel (2002), Revelli (2002), Schaltegger and Küttel (2002), 
Bordignon, Ceniglia and Revelli (2003), Feld, Josselin and Rocaboy (2003), Solé-Ollé (2003), Allers and 
Elhorst (2005), Hendrick, Wu and Jacob (2005), Leprince, Paty and Reulier (2005), Revelli (2006), 
Vermeir and Heyndels (2006), Fiva and Rattsø (2007), Revelli and Tovmo (2007), Elhorst and Fréret 
(2008).   7
interaction or mimicking behaviour as a manifestation of yardstick competition. In some 
cases, the evidence only confirms the existence among politicians in office of a belief 
that voters engage in comparisons, not the fact that voters do that, but this possible 
limitation can be dealt with by the assumption that politicians are rational. In other 
cases, there is some empirical evidence that mimicking improves re-election prospects. 
The empirical studies employ statistical techniques. Some differences across 
jurisdictions (term limits, or the role given to referendums, for instance) are welcome 
because they allow to discriminate between several explanations of the same mimicking 
behaviour and thus to confirm or disconfirm the role of yardstick competition. Other 
differences are not welcome but their effect is only to reduce the statistical significance 
of the overall relation or they can be dealt with in part by the way of control variables. 
Many studies are concerned with a relation not between the levels of variables such as 
taxes but between their variation (for instance, increases in taxation in each jurisdiction 
related to increases in taxation in other jurisdictions) and this relation may be assumed 
to be less affected by interjurisdictional differences. 
In fact, existing large differences among jurisdictions do play a significant role in 
empirical work, albeit in a mostly implicit or invisible way. Typically, the jurisdictions 
studied are a subset of those that could be considered: regions in one country only, or 
local government in a particular part of a single country (Flanders, or the region around 
Milan, or that around Chicago, for instance). This may reflect either practical 
constraints or the opinion that comparisons extended to a larger space are unlikely to be 
made or are irrelevant because then the differences across jurisdictions would be too 
large.
2 The fact or assumption, in some studies, that the interactions are stronger 
between contiguous jurisdictions is ascribed to the likelihood that these jurisdictions are 
easier for voters to compare, and this in part because they are more similar, which is an 
explicit way to acknowledge that dissimilarity counts.  
Altogether, from the perspective of empirical work, differences seem to be 
manageable, even when relatively large. But we must not forget that, in most of the 
empirical work, the underlying assumption is that yardstick competition takes place 
along a single dimension, or, implicitly along dimensions that are independent and can 
be studied separately. In one study, voters are assumed to compare the levels of the 
                                                 
2 See Gérard, Jayet and Paty (2008) for a direct investigation, on Belgian data, of the impact of one 
difference, language.    8
property tax. In another, they are assumed to compare the levels of the business tax. In 
another still, voters compare the level of social expenditures. These studies are held to 
be compatible. This is standard practice in empirical work and it is perhaps also 
acceptable, as we will see shortly, under one of the two broader perspectives on the 
systemic role of yardstick competition referred to above. Under the other perspective, 
which we discuss first, large differences are more difficult to handle. 
 
2.2 The quest for justified assessments of multidimensional performance 
Under the systemic perspective discussed in this subsection, the accountability of 
office-holders is supposed to depend on the capacity of voters to make objective or 
justified assessments of performance. That requirement has two intellectual sources. 
First, it stems, naturally it seems, from the concerns of independent individual observers 
such as economists and statisticians or from neutrality constraints that international 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund, the OECD and the World Bank 
must respect. Because of their deontological obligations, both these individuals and 
these organizations, when undertaking to evaluate or compare the performance of 
governments, are obliged to seek objectivity and to justify their results. When 
differences between jurisdictions are large and there are many policy dimensions, 
comparative evaluations satisfying these conditions are complex and contestable.  
For convenience, let us assume that jurisdictions A and B are two countries rather 
than two regions. They have very different clusters of characteristics. Pensions, social 
security and unemployment benefits are more advantageous in country A but the 
average level of wages is higher and the rate of unemployment lower in country B; 
some time ago, the differences were smaller. Gauging the overall performance of the 
two governments or “national models” is tricky. Because of complementarity between 
the characteristics, considering only one of them would be questionable or unfair.
3 But 
the weights put on the various dimensions to construct aggregate indexes depend on 
value judgements which can be questioned and must be explicit. It is quite natural to 
transpose to the level of individual citizens or voters the ideals that guide economists 
and international organizations. However, if it is difficult for trained economists and 
statisticians in the academia or in the staff of international organizations to make 
                                                 
3 For a criticism along that line of some of the literature on corporate governance, see Salmon (2006).    9
satisfactory comparative assessments when interjurisdictional differences are large, how 
implausible it is, it seems, that voters’ assessments can be other than haphazard or 
arbitrary.  
Although (as noted) we do not consider vertical competition here, let us observe in 
passing that the requirement of objectivity and transparency applies also to comparative 
evaluations of the performance of governments situated on different levels of the 
governmental systems. At a minimum, it is claimed, one should be able to say what 
government is responsible for what policy outcome. This suggests that competencies 
must be clearly defined and concurrency avoided. If this is not the case (and it will 
never be the case in practice, notably because of vertical competition), then a separate 
objective assessment of the different governments is difficult for experts to achieve and 
completely implausible when ascribed to voters.  
The second intellectual influence leading to the requirement of objectivity and 
justification is the theory of agency as elaborated originally for the private sector. 
Mechanisms identified in the framework of that theory are assumed to underlie also the 
relationship between voters as principals and office-holders as agents. Yardstick 
competition itself (or, as in Salmon 1987, “contests and tournaments”) is an instance of 
adaptation which will not be questioned here. But the transplant of other aspects of the 
theory of agency, in particularly those related to the notion of contract, are often too 
direct or literal, with implications that one is tempted to judge misleading. In the theory 
of contracts and incentives, in its original habitat, the necessity of some clarity in 
performance criteria follows from the fact that remuneration is related in an automatic 
or quasi-automatic way to the evaluation of performance. Good and bad performance 
are rewarded and sanctioned under conditions which must be contractually defined in 
advance – even if this is done only in broad terms (as stressed, actually, by the 
economic theory of contracts itself). As is well known, the automatic realization of 
contractually defined rewards and sanctions may generate perverse incentives, 
especially when the jobs assigned to agents include many tasks, unevenly definable or 
measurable, and it can prove catastrophic in unforeseen circumstances, as experienced 
recently in the financial markets. In particular, yardstick competition – that is, here,   10
remuneration based on automatic relative assessments of performance – may prove 
quite perverse in some contexts. But it is often the case that doing without it is worse.
4 
These are general remarks. When transposed to the question of the electoral 
accountability of office-holders, the contractual interpretation of the theory of agency 
has been used to give some rigour and precision to the pre-existing theory of 
retrospective voting. In the language of American political science (Key 1966, Fiorina 
1981), the basic idea of retrospective voting is captured by Madison’s formula: “throw 
the rascals out”. But we may also cite Popper (1945), for whom democracy is merely a 
system in which “the ruled can get rid of bad rulers without bloodshed”. When 
formalized under the inspiration of a contractual version of the theory of agency (see 
Ferejohn 1986, e.g.), the theory typically involves three assumptions: first, there is a 
threshold of underperformance at which voters decide to replace office holders; second, 
the decision is collective and requires coordination or consensus among voters; third, 
the assessment is asymmetric, in the sense that it does not matter whether performance 
is a little or very much above the limit. If yardstick competition is introduced in this 
context, any kind of ambiguity, heterogeneity among jurisdictions and individuals, or 
lack of transparency in vertical responsibilities is an obstacle to accountability. 
Ultimately, accountability objectives may be better served under centralization than 
under decentralization (Treisman 2006). 
In the context of yardstick competition, the insistence on transparency and 
objectivity, even though inspired by concerns about democratic accountability, is often 
exaggerated. It underestimates the capacities of voters. But the idea of a contract 
between the electorate and the government and the ensuing requirement of coordination 
among voters are worse. They are misleading for most intellectual purposes. The idea of 
a threshold and that of asymmetry, properly reinterpreted, remain useful in some 
contexts, such as the mainly single dimensional one we will assume in the second part 
of this contribution. However, on a systemic level and when the multidimensional 
characteristics of the setting are essential, an image of accountability and yardstick 
competition different from the one underlying the perspective just discussed seems 
preferable, as explained now. 
 
                                                 
4 See Salmon (2005) for a balanced analysis along that line of the kind of benchmarking proposed by the 
World Bank in its Doing Business reports.    11
2.3. Trusting the individual voter’s assessment of multidimensional performance 
Under this second perspective, each individual voter assesses the performance of the 
incumbents as she sees fit. She may put any weights she wants on the different 
dimensions of the policy outcomes, without having any justification to provide or any 
obligation to remain fair or objective (or, for that matter, rational). The fact that there 
are many dimensions to the performance of incumbents raises no problem of 
aggregation at this individual level. To form an opinion, the individual voter can use 
any means that she finds appropriate. She may seek or follow advice from any source. 
She may use comparisons with what obtains in other jurisdictions if she has the 
occasion and feels inclined to do so. To make these comparisons, she chooses the 
jurisdictions and the outcomes compared which she thinks appropriate. In the end, on 
elections day, she decides to vote for or against the incumbents, again without any need 
to justify that decision, which may be inspired by a comparison of platforms, a 
subjective evaluation of performance, or, for that matter, the differential personal appeal 
of the candidates.  
The incumbents do not know how each voter will vote. They know that some 
voters will never and some others always vote for them but they are uncertain about the 
votes of many. They are aware that some votes might be in part inspired by an 
assessment of performance and that such assessment may involve comparisons with 
what obtains in other jurisdictions.  But office-holders don’t know exactly on what 
matter and with what jurisdictions these comparisons are made. Many voters will be 
mistaken. For instance, they will misjudge what obtains elsewhere. But if we believe in 
democracy we must assume that on average and as a rule the judgement of voters will 
not be widely incorrect. Voters will not on average compare what is not comparable. On 
average, they will manage somehow to deal correctly with large differences across 
jurisdictions.
5 In that context, incumbents see any improvement of their relative 
performance in any dimension as increasing, ceteris paribus, the aggregate probability 
of being re-elected, and, conversely, any deterioration as increasing the probability of 
being defeated.  
                                                 
5 Breton and Fraschini (2003) and Breton (2006), on the one side, and Geys (2006), on the other, discuss 
in a different way the implications of assuming that voters compare across jurisdictions some indicator of 
the tightness of the relationship between services delivered and taxes paid –  i.e., “Wicksellian 
connections” in the first case, “efficiency” in the second.    12
Whether this perception of office holders is important or not depends mostly on 
the intensity and nature of political competition and in particular electoral competition. 
The intensity may be deemed high if incumbents are very uncertain about their chances 
of being re-elected. But also the nature of competition must be such that the 
performance along the different dimensions plays some role in the outcome. If the two 
conditions are satisfied, each vote will count, as seen by incumbents, and decision-
making by the incumbents will take into account the fact that there are voters comparing 
outcomes across jurisdictions even if it is known that few of them do so. 
Provided the ceteris paribus clause just mentioned is kept in mind, that systemic 
view of yardstick competition justifies, even when there are many policy dimensions in 
reality, the piecemeal empirical approach in public finance discussed earlier. Both the 
systemic view and the empirical work imply that interjurisdictional differences are not 
insurmountable obstacles to the working of yardstick competition. 
 
2.4 Shrinking dimensionality 
Even though voters make up their minds on the basis of all sorts of considerations, and 
the comparisons among jurisdictions some of them engage in may be about all sort of 
items, it is often the case that circumstances make one dimension of policy-making 
acquire a major importance, and attract – or so one should expect as seen from the 
outside – most of the attention of voters. This is likely to be especially the case when 
the relative performance of government along that dimension is seriously inferior to that 
which should be expected.
6 Persistent economic underperformance is particularly likely 
to gain such salience. Voter X is principally attentive to the facilities for sports and 
recreation available in his or her region compared to those offered in neighbouring ones, 
and he or she is also, albeit moderately, concerned with the relative growth rates in the 
regions. But as the negative gap between the growth rate in his or her own region and 
that in others increases, at one point this relative underperformance becomes 
predominant in X’s mind and in the way X assesses the incumbents on the occasion of 
the election. If many voters change their priorities in this way, this allows us to revert, 
in part at least, to the theoretical interpretation of retrospective voting summarized (and 
criticized) earlier. 
                                                 
6 This is asymmetric accountability again. There is some empirical evidence supporting it. Electoral 
choices seem to be more influenced by dissatisfaction than by satisfaction. See James and John (2007).    13
 
3.    Yardstick competition and the persistence of large regional 
differences in economic performance 
 
3.1. A theoretical  framework 
Suppose that region A suffers from a relatively low economic performance. The 
performance gap is measured along a single dimension. It is established “objectively” 
(never mind the criticism of objectivity implicit in Section 2) by economists using 
comparisons with other regions in a sophisticated way.
7 For instance, the apparent 
relative underperformance of a region is due (at least for a while) to a change in 
international prices about which the regional government can do nothing. Economists 
will correct for this. We will not suppose that voters notice what economists say, 
although their opinion may play a role in the political debate, but that direct 
comparisons with what obtains in other regions eventually enable at least some voters to 
become aware of the gap.  We may assume that the greater the objective gap, the greater 
the awareness of it among voters – that is, the greater the perceived gap.  
A perceived gap will generate some degree of dissatisfaction or discontent among 
some voters and, in a similar vein, we may assume that the greater the perceived gap, 
the more widespread and/or intense the discontent among voters. The two effects can be 
combined and we may assume that, altogether, the greater the objective gap, the more 
intense and widespread the discontent among voters. The relation, however, is not 
linear. In Figure 1, it takes the form of S-shaped curve V. A small gap is not perceived 
at all: up to a point, its effect on discontent is zero. Above some level of the gap, the 
marginal effect becomes strictly positive and is increasing. And above a still higher 
level, the marginal effect of the gap on discontent is still strictly positive but decreasing. 
At one point it may become zero. Curve V represents a case in which the reaction of 
voters to objective underperformance is strong. For reasons to be discussed shortly, the 
effect of objective underperformance on discontent may be weak. This is reflected in 
Figure 1 by curve W. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
7 For an early instance of such exercise at the international level, see Dowrick and Nguyen (1989)   14
How do office-holders react to discontent?   This depends to a large extent on 
what we may call the political set-up. A given level of discontent will not have the same 
effect under a system in which office-holding is highly "contestable", and under one in 
which voters cannot but with great difficulty get rid of rulers whom they do not like. 
The effect of discontent on the likelihood of political or policy change may thus serve as 
an indicator of the nature of the political set-up. In Figure 1, the horizontal line passing 
through a point such as TL or TH on the vertical axis indicates the tolerance level of 
discontent associated with the political system – that is, the level of discontent that 
would create a political crisis serious enough for compelling a change in the political 
personnel in power or, at least, a drastic policy change with the same office-holders. 
Incumbents will do their best for that not to happen and thus to make sure that 
discontent does not reach the tolerance level. In Figure 1, only two political regimes are 
considered, and thus two political tolerance lines drawn. The line passing through TL 
(tolerance low) corresponds to a “high contestability” political system and the line 
passing through TH (tolerance high) corresponds to a system in which contestability is 
low. These lines intersect with curves V and W at points A, B, C and D. The 
performance gaps corresponding to these points are GA, GB, GC and GD respectively.  
A brief commentary on the four points: yardstick competition works best in A and 
worst in D; B corresponds to a situation in which comparisons work well and their 
effect on discontent is strong, but the political tolerance of discontent is large; in C, the 
political tolerance of discontent is low but comparisons meet some obstacles and/or 
their effect on discontent is weak.  
 
3.3. Factors that  may in general increase the tolerance of performance gaps 
The logic of the framework suggests dividing the possible factors into three categories, 
depending on whether they affect perceived underperformance, discontent or political 
tolerance of discontent. With regard to the first, we need not dwell on obvious 
impediments to comparisons, like language or the lack of information. As noted, the 
identification and measurement of objective underperformance may be relatively 
complex. And complexity in establishing objective performance weakens the relation 
between objective performance and perceived performance. We may illustrate the point 
just made by taking the case not of a region but of a country, Britain. As compared to   15
other European countries, Britain had a high level of income per head after World War 
II. Then, over a relatively long period of time, it underperformed in terms of economic 
growth but still not in terms of income per head. Initially, this could be interpreted as 
reflecting a process of catching up by the other European countries. There was some 
growth in Britain and only economists argued, on the basis of comparisons, that there 
should be more. When income per head in Britain did fall below that of several other 
European countries – first Germany, then France, then Italy – it needed some time for 
public opinion to react but eventually the reaction took place. In terms of Figure 1, the 
relevant curve for post-War II Britain is clearly curve W rather than curve V. 
This kind of difficulties should not be overstated, however. Post-war Britain was a 
particular case, as is perhaps the United States today. In general, there will be large 
differences among some countries or regions but sufficient similarity among others. 
Only seldom will one jurisdiction be completely apart and its inhabitants lacking 
relevant objects of comparison. If it argued that there are pitfalls, both for experts and 
for voters, in comparing economic performance between former East Germany and the 
rest of the country, between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy, or between the 
former Communist countries of central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe, there 
are other comparisons available that the general public can easily understand. For 
instance, voters in Thuringia may engage in comparisons with Saxony and Brandenburg 
along some dimensions and with Bavaria and Hessen along others.  
The willingness of voters to get – or perhaps more accurately, to register – 
information, even when at no or little cost, is related to their attention capacity, which is 
limited, and to the stakes involved. These determinants also explain in part the level of 
information provided by the media, which tends to reflect demand. In France the two 
levels attracting the most attention – notably because their decisions and influence on 
matters of concern to voters are important – are the central and the municipal ones. An 
intermediary tier like the regional one receives less attention. Thus, the bad economic 
performance of a region is less likely to become a major topic of the political debate and 
of conversation among the voters of the region than many issues concerning the national 
or municipal levels. This is of course quite different in decentralized federal countries 
such as Canada and Switzerland.   16
The effect of a perceived gap on the level of discontent is influenced in part by the 
same factors as those just discussed (some factors affect indistinctly the willingness to 
register information and the effect of information on discontent). But additional factors, 
of a more political nature, also play a role. Large sectors of the electorate may be aware 
of underperformance but fail to contribute to the overall discontent that ensues. The 
reason may be clientele ties with the incumbents, loyalty to political parties, domination 
of ideological cleavages, expression of national concerns in the regional vote, salience 
of other specific issues. An example of the salience of other issues is the concern with 
separatism in Quebec, which at times dominated the elections in that province. These 
various factors may or may not reduce political competition (for instance, in Quebec the 
outcome of elections could be quite uncertain, reflecting strong political competition), 
but they weaken the relationship between underperformance, even perfectly perceived, 
and discontent. Their main effect on the shape of curve W is, as depicted in Figure 1, to 
lower the higher inflexion point of curve W: to generate more overall discontent than 
the level corresponding to that point, underperformance encounters diminishing returns 
(in more precise language, the second derivative of the relation is negative). 
In a given jurisdiction, the level of political tolerance to discontent depends on 
persistent characteristics of the political system and on more time dependent aspects of 
politics. In the first category, one finds matters such as whether the system is more 
presidential or parliamentary and the degree to which the electoral system by itself 
favours or hampers accountability. In some cases these characteristics interact with 
permanent (for instance ethnic or spatial) features of the electorate and with the 
organization of the political parties notably across levels. Recourse to a referendum may 
also be a way for voters to express their discontent with some policy and to impose 
some change. Consequently, the constitutional treatment of referendum may also be an 
important feature of the structural set-up. 
Features of the political situation in the jurisdiction at a point in time – very 
important in empirical work, as we saw, to disentangle yardstick competition and other 
mechanisms producing the same observable results – are less relevant in the context of 
the present discussion. As already noted, politicians in office may be more impervious 
to discontent if the next election is far away, if they cannot be candidates in the next 
election because of term limits, or if the present majority supporting them is large.   17
As Figure 1 suggests, an improvement in the political set-up applicable to all 
regions – as happened in Italy in 1995 (see Padovano and Ricciuti 2009) – making that 
set-up more competitive and consequently policy-making more responsive to voters’ 
discontent should have a particularly large effect on performance in the jurisdictions in 
which the relationship between underperformance and discontent is weak. Suppose that 
curves V and W correspond to two regions, and that actual underperformance is a 
function of – or, at the limit, equal to – the maximum tolerated level of 
underperformance. Then the introduction of more political competitiveness in the set-up 
(the horizontal tolerance line moving downwards) will improve performance mainly in 
the region whose performance was the worse. It might not change very much the 
situation in the region in which there was less underperformance. If changing the 
political set-ups in the regions falls in the competencies of the central government, and 
if political reforms are costly, this differential effect might inspire some differentiation 
between the set-ups themselves, which would create or strengthen some institutional 
asymmetry. 
 
3.4. Some particular causes of persistent regional economic underperformance 
The foregoing possibilities are not sufficient to explain the kind of long-lasting 
economic performance gaps which is a matter of concern in the countries listed at the 
outset (Belgium, France, Germany and Italy). Explanations based on some 
characteristics of the political system or on a lack of political competition come to mind. 
They are plausible in particular cases but lack generality, which is a serious weakness 
given the similarity of the problem in the countries discussed here. Political competition 
is at least as strong in, say, Thuringia, than in Bavaria. One might argue that the lack of 
autonomy of the regions concerned (except perhaps in the Belgian case) and the fact 
that, often, the political parties in these regions are more or less the ones active at the 
national level tend to reduce the attention given by voters to the regional government 
and to the political debate in the region. Voters may feel that the regional incumbents 
cannot really be held accountable for the economic situation of the region. But, then, the 
voters of a region will make their discontent felt at the relevant level by voting in all 
elections (both national and regional) against the party in office at the national level (see 
Treisman 2006). This is perfectly compatible with strong political competition at the   18
regional level. The question thus does not seem to be the political response to discontent 
but the existence and nature of this discontent. 
We must fall back, to serve as a starting point, on the widely made observation 
that the standard of living of the inhabitants of the regions concerned and their 
consuming habits are far from fully reflecting the negative economic performance gap. 
The reason, of course, is that the said regions typically benefit from a substantial 
transfer of resources from the other regions, some of the transfer relatively transparent 
but the bulk of it hidden.
8 Many public services (health, education, welfare, police, 
justice, defence, regulation, consumer protection, etc.) are provided in more or less 
homogeneous quantity and quality across regions. With respect to these services, there 
is no gap at all. If the cost of living is lower in the regions concerned while the 
remuneration of public servants is the same in all regions, the standard of living of 
public employees may be even higher than in the rest of the country. This is not, on 
average or as a rule, the case of the rest of the population, whose income per head is 
generally lower than the country average. But the difference is smaller than the one 
which could be expected from the economic gap.  
This discrepancy between production or productivity, on the one side, and real 
income and consumption, on the other, has three consequences. The first concerns the 
perception of the economic underperformance. Everybody in the regions concerned has 
heard about it because, in the whole country, it is much discussed in the media and the 
cafés, but most people in these regions – except if they are unemployed of have 
unemployed relatives – have no personal experience of it. Thus even though, in the 
language of our model, the perceived gap is close to the objective gap, it generates 
relatively little discontent.
9 Second, the comparisons made by inhabitants of a region 
not with other regions of the same country but with other countries in some respect 
similar to the region often tell these inhabitants that more economic performance abroad 
is associated with an inferior standard of living.  People in Guadeloupe may envy the 
success of the tourism industry in the Dominican Republic but they are not ready to 
compromise, at least in the short and medium terms, their standard of living and way of 
life to get comparable results. If there is some discontent, it is targeted to the level of the 
                                                 
8 See Brosio (2007) for a discussion of the pros and cons of transparency and obfuscation in this context. 
9 For a related argument, see Kotsogiannis and Schwager (2008). See also Donovan, Brown and Bellulo 
(2001).   19
transfers received by the region, deemed insufficient, and not to the underperformance 
itself, typically perceived as a second best, or to the complete integration of the region 
in the national system of public services and regulation. In general, not only 
independence but even the increased autonomy proposed by the national government 
tends to prove unwanted by the majority of the population.  
Third, this deadlocked situation is propitious to – and made worse by – the 
development of the perverse exit-voice mechanism analysed many years ago by 
Hirschman (1970).  If citizens in a jurisdiction are dissatisfied with public policies and 
emigration costs are low, while changing these policies appears to be uncertain, some 
citizens will emigrate. If dissatisfaction with the situation is not equally shared by 
individuals, it is likely that those who emigrate are more dissatisfied on average than 
those who decide to stay. Emigration makes the situation even more sustainable than it 
would be without it and thus is unlikely to induce any change of policies. If the process 
of exit goes on, disparities in performance across jurisdictions are thus particularly 
likely to last or even increase without check, even with a high level of information 
available to all.  
This may happen to independent countries. But sub-national jurisdictions are 
more easily subject than whole countries to the process. Moving out of a region or city 
is less costly as a rule than moving out of a whole country, information about what 
obtains in other jurisdictions at the same level is easier to come by. A more crucial 
difference between the national and the regional settings is that national governments 
usually have the constitutional, fiscal and regulatory means to adapt policies so as to 
improve economic performance. And because of yardstick competition at the 
international level, national governments, especially in the setting of the EU, have an 
incentive to do so even if this is difficult (as argued in the Introduction). But both the 
freedom and the incentive may be lacking in the context in which regions are often 
placed. Thus, we can expect regional decline or stagnation to be a much more 
widespread and significant phenomenon and to extend over longer periods of time than 
the decline or stagnation of countries as a whole.  
Yardstick competition is mainly a matter of information and, to work reasonably 
well, needs also political competition. But information and political competition in the 
underperforming regions cannot be assumed to be generally lacking. Thus, their   20
occasional or even frequent failures cannot be the factors mainly responsible for the 
kind of regional economic underperformance discussed here. The basic problem is that 
voters, even when well informed, have no real incentive to seek policy changes. Under 
these conditions, yardstick competition cannot work – or can work only potentially (it 
would influence policies only at levels of underperformance even greater than those 
observed). 
   
4.   Conclusion 
It has been suggested that large regional differences are an obstacle to that component 
of the accountability of governments which is based on yardstick competition. The 
foregoing discussion concluded that the obstacle is not too serious in general. The 
second part of the paper was devoted to the persistent economic underperformance of 
some regions in countries such as Germany, Italy and (with regard to regions overseas) 
France. How is it that yardstick competition contributed to bring about a convergence of 
economic performance among European Union member countries, including those 
which were particularly poor at the outset, but fails to induce any process of catching up 
by the persistently underperforming regions of the countries above? A small model was 
used to explore that question. In the case or the persistently underperforming regions, it 
turns out that the degree of regional differentiation is not sufficient for yardstick 
competition to work and induce an improvement in performance. The incentives which 
are lacking are above all those of the voters in these regions, even though these voters 
may be well informed. The yardstick competition framework is useful if it helps 
understand more clearly why yardstick competition fails. 
 
References 
Allers, M.A. and J.P. Elhorst (2005). “Tax mimicking and yardstick competition among local 
governments in the Netherlands”, International Tax and Public Finance 12: 493-513. 
Ashworth, J. and B. Heyndels (1997). “Politicians’ preferences on local tax rates: an empirical 
analysis”, European Journal of Political Economy 13: 479-502. 
Besley, T. and A. Case (1995). “Incumbent behavior: vote-seeking, tax-setting, and yardstick 
competition”, American Economic Review 85: 25-45. 
Bordignon, M., F. Cerniglia and F. Revelli (2003). “In search of yardstick competition: a spatial 
analysis of Italian municipality property tax setting”, Journal of Urban Economics 54: 
199-217. 
Brennan, G. and J.M. Buchanan (1980). The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   21
Breton, A. (1996). Competitive Governments: An Economic Theory of Politics and Public 
Finance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Breton, A. (2006). “Modelling vertical competition”, in E. Ahmad and G. Brosio (eds), 
Handbook of Fiscal Federalism, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp. 86-105. 
Breton, A. and A. Fraschini (2003).”Vertical competition in unitary states: the case of Italy”, 
Public Choice 114(1-2): 57-77. 
Brosio, G. (2007). “Cases for and against transparency/obfuscation in intergovernmental 
relations”, in: A. Breton, G. Galeotti, P. Salmon and R. Wintrobe (eds), The Economics of 
Transparency in Politics, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 173-87. 
Cai, H. and D. Treisman (2005). “Does competition for capital discipline governments? 
decentralization, globalization and public policy”, American Economic Review 95(3): 
817-30. 
Coelli, T., M. Lefèbvre and P. Pestieau (2008). Social protection performance in the European 
Union: comparison and convergence. CORE Discussion paper 2008/12. 
Donovan, V., J. Brown and L. Bellulo (2001). “Satisfaction with public services: a discussion 
paper”, MS. 
Dowrick, S. and D.-T. Nguyen (1989). “OECD comparative economic growth 1950-85: catch-
up and convergence”, American Economic Review 79(5): 1010-30. 
Elhorst, J.P. and S. Fréret (2008). “French evidence of political yardstick competition using a 
two-regimes spatial Durbin model”, MS. 
Feld L.P., J.-M. Josselin and Y. Rocaboy (2002). “Tax mimicking among regional 
jurisdictions”, in: A. Marciano and J.-M. Josselin (eds), From Economic to Legal 
Competition: New Perspectives on Law and Institutions in Europe, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, pp. 105-119. 
Ferejohn, J. (1986). “Incumbent performance and electoral control”, Public Choice 50: 5-26. 
Fiorina, M. (1981). Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 
Fiva, Jon H.  and Jørn Rattsø (2007). “Local choice of property taxation: evidence from 
Norway”, Public Choice 132: 457-470. 
Gérard, M., H. Jayet and S. Paty (2008). “Tax interactions among Belgian municipalities: does 
language matter?” MS 
Geys, B. (2006). “Looking across borders: a test of spatial policy interdependence using local 
government efficiency ratings”, Journal of Urban Economics 60(3): 443-62. 
Hendrick, R., Y. Wu and B. Jacob (2005). “Tax competition among municipal governments: 
exit vs. voice” , MS. 
Heyndels, B. and J. Vuchelen (1998). “Tax mimicking among Belgian municipalities,” National 
Tax Journal 60: 89-101. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, Voice and Loyalty. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
James, O. and P. John (2007). “Public management at the ballot box: performance information 
and electoral support for incumbent English local governments”, Journal of Public 
Administration Research and Theory 17(4): 567-80. 
Jayet, H., S. Paty and A. Pentel (2002) “Existe-t-il des interactions fiscales stratégiques entre les 
collectivités locales?”, Economie et Prévision 154: 95-105. 
Jin, J., Y. Qian and B. R. Weingast (2005). “Regional decentralization and fiscal incentives: 
federalism, Chinese style”, Journal of Public Economics 89: 1719-42.  
Key, V.O. (1966). The Responsible Electorate. New York: Vintage Books. 
Kotsogiannis, C. and R. Schwager (2008). “Accountability and fiscal equalization”, Journal of 
Public Economics 92: 2336–49. 
Leprince, M., S. Paty and E. Reulier (2005). “Choix d'imposition et interactions spatiales entre 
collectivités locales: un test sur les départements français”, Recherches Economiques de 
Louvain 71 (1): 67-93. 
Oates, W.E. (1972). Fiscal Federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.   22
Padovano, F. and R. Ricciuti (2009), “Political competition and economic performance: 
evidence from the Italian regions”, Public Choice 138 (3-4): 263-77. 
Popper, K.R. (1945). The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume 1: Plato, London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul. 
Przeworski, A., S.C. Stokes and B. Manin (eds) (1999). Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Revelli, F. (2002). “Local taxes, national politics and spatial interactions in English district 
election results”, European Journal of Political Economy 18(2): 281-99. 
Revelli, F. (2006). “Performance rating and yardstick competition in social service provision”, 
Journal of Public Economics 90: 458-474. 
Revelli, F. and P. Tovmo (2007). “Revealed yardstick competition: local government efficiency 
patterns in Norway”, Journal of Urban Economics 62: 121–34. 
Salmon, P. (1987). "Decentralisation as an incentive scheme," Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 3(2): 24-43. 
Salmon, P. (2003)."Assigning powers in the European Union in the light of yardstick 
competition among governments", Jahrbuch für Neue Politische Ökonomie 22, European 
Governance: 197-216. 
Salmon, Pierre (2005).”L’apport informatif des rapports Doing Business est précieux mais 
attention aux effets pervers”, in G. Canivet, M.-A. Frison-Roche and M. Klein (eds), 
Mesurer l’efficacité économique du droit, Paris: L.G.D.J., pp. 109-122. 
Salmon, P. (2006). “Political yardstick competition and corporate governance in the European 
Union”, in G. Ferrarini and E. Wymeersch (eds), Investor Protection in Europe, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pp. 31-58.  
Schaltegger, C.A. and D. Küttel D (2002) “Exit, voice, and mimicking behavior: evidence from 
Swiss cantons”. Public Choice 113: 1-23. 
Solé-Ollé, A (2003). “Electoral accountability and tax mimicking: the effects of electoral 
margins, coalition government, and ideology”, European Journal of Political Economy 
19: 685-713.  
Treisman, D. (2007). The Architecture of Government: Rethinking Political Decentralization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Vermeir, J. and B. Heyndels (2006). “Tax policy and yardstick voting in Flemish municipal 
elections”, Applied Economics 38(19): 2285-98. 
Weingast, B.J. (1995). “The economic role of political institutions: market-preserving 
federalism and economic development”, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 
11 (1): 1-31. 
 











































V discontent    
TH    
T  L    
A   C
B   D
GB   GA    GC  GD 
performance  gap  
W   
O  
Figure 1: Political limits to negative performance   